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counseled indigent include only a trial record and pro se submissions.
Conspicuously absent are the prior assistance of counsel in examination
of the trial record and preparation of arguments to the appellate court,
and an intermediate appellate court once passing on those claims.8 .
The inference is compelling that this -treatment falls below the line of
adequacy drawn in Ross, thus giving rise to a constitutional right to
counsel.
CONCLUSION

Over a decade ago the Supreme Court, examining the rights of
indigent persons, stated that "[the methods we employ in the enforcement of our criminal law have aptly been called the measures by which
-the quality of our civilization may be judged." 90 More recently, in
finding a sixth amendment guarantee of counsel at trial whenever there
exists a possibility of a prison sentence, the Court felt that "the adversary system functions best and most fairly only when all parties are
represented by competent counsel." 91 Ross v. Moffitt, in disposing of
a constitutional claim of right to counsel on discretionary appeals in all
but atypical situations, contrasts strikingly with these principles. A
state's highest court, as final arbiter of interpretation of state common
law, might provide the most meaningful review of a criminal conviction.9 2 This fact is unaffected -by whether access to that court is by
right or discretion. Ross describes certiorari practice as a "somewhat
arcane art."98 If -this be -true, lawyers, not pro se indigent appellants,
should unravel its mysteries.
STANLEY D. DAVIS

Labor Law-Preemption of State Damage Remedies for Discharge
Since the Taft-Hartley amendments to the National Labor Rela89. See text accompanying note 32 supra.
90. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 449 (1962).
91. Argersinger v. Hanlin, 407 U.S. 25, 65 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring).
92. See, e.g., State v. Dix, 282 N.C. 490, 193 S.E.2d 897 (1973), revg State v.
Dix, 14 N.C. App. 328, 188 S.E.2d 737 (1972) (modifying elements of common law
kidnapping relied on by lower court).
93. 417 U.S. at 616.
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tions Act' excluded supervisors 2 from the protection of the Act,, the
question of whether supervisors could be protected by state law has
gone unanswered. In Beasley v. Food Fair, Inc. 4 the United States
Supreme Court faced this question squarely 5 and held that the remedy,

granted by North Carolina's Right-to-Work Law," for discharge because of union membership was preempted by section 14(a)7 of the
National Labor Relations Act. 8 In reaching this conclusion, -the Court
appears to have relied on the policy rather than the language of section
14(a). As a result, the impact of section 14(a) on state laws regulating the conduct of supervisors will be much more devastating than
was intended by Congress. 9
The petitioners, managers of meat departments in respondent
Food Fair's stores, were discharged because of their union member-

ship.

Their union filed charges with the National Labor Relations

1. Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151-64 (1970).
2. Id. § 152(11) provides:
The term "supervisor" means any individual having authority, in the interest
of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge,
assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or
to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely
routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.
3. Id. § 152(3) provides in the relevant portion as follows: "The term employee
shall not include. . . any individual employed as a supervisor ..
4. 416 U.S. 653 (1974).
5. Id. at 657.
6. N.C. Gmr. STAT. H§ 95-78 to -84 (1965). The relevant sections provide as
follows:
§ 95-81. . . . No person shall be required by an employer to abstain
or refrain from membership in any labor union or labor organization as a
condition of employment or continuation of employment.
§ 95-83. . . . Any person who may be denied employment or be deprived of continuation of his employment in violation of . . . § 95-81 . . .
shall be entitled to recover from such employer and from any other person,
firm, corporation, or association acting in concert with him by appropriate
action in the courts of this State such damages as he may have sustained by
reason of such denial or devrivation of employment.
7. 29 U.S.C. § 164(a) (1970). This section provides as follows: "Nothing
herein shall prohibit any individual employed as a supervisor from becoming or remaining a member of a labor organization, but no employer subject to this subchapter shall
be compelled to deem individuals defined herein as supervisors as employees for the purpose of any law, either national or local, relating to collective bargaining."
8. 416 U.S. at 658.
9. Congressional intent is evidenced by the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare Report on the Labor-Management Relations Act. S. REP. No. 105, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1947). The relevant language is: "This is a new section which makes
it clear . . . that it is contrary to national policy for other Federal or state agencies
to compel employers . . . to treat supervisors as employees for the purpose of collective
bargaining or organizational activity." Id. at 28,
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Board alleging violation of section 8(a)(1) I ° of the National Labor
Relations Act. The Regional Director refused to issue a complaint,
and the General Counsel denied the appeal that followed on the
ground that petitioners were supervisors" and therefore not entitled
12
to the protections of the Act.'
Following the refusal to issue a complaint, the petitioners sued in
North Carolina Superior Court -alleging that their discharge violated
sections 95-81 and 95-8313 of North Carolina's Right-to-Work Law.
The trial court granted summary judgment to the respondents on the
ground that the second clause of section 14(a)"4 of the National Labor
Relations Act prohibited enforcement of the State law in favor of
supervisors.' 5 The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed, holding
that the State law was not preempted.' 6 The court reasoned that since
supervisors are excluded from the protections of -the National Labor
Relations Act' 7 their activities could not fall within -the "arguably prohibited or arguably protected" test for preemption.' 8 The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed and reinstated -the trial court decision. 19
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari" and affirmed the decision of the North Carolina Supreme Court. It reasoned

as follows:
the second clause of §14(a) relieving the employer of obligations
under "any law, either National or local, relating to collective bargaining" applies to any law that requires an employer "to accord to
10. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) (1970). This section makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of
the right to form, join, or assist labor organizations." The theory of the union was that
the discharge of supervisors would interfere with the organizational activities of the employees; if supervisors are discharged because of union membership, other employees
might think they also could be discharged. Such subtle coercion by employers violates
section 8(a)(1) and will be remedied by an order for reinstatement with back pay of
the discharged supervisors. NLRB v. Better Monkey Grip Co., 243 F.2d 836 (5th Cir.)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 864 (1957); NLRB v. Talladega Cotton Factory,
Inc., 213 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1954).
11. The union had asked for and been granted a representation election by the
Board prior to the discharge. In considering the election petition, the Board had determined the petitioners were supervisors and had excluded them from the bargaining unit.
This finding was a clear and binding determination of the petitioners' supervisory status.
12. See text accompanying note 28 infra.
13. See note 6 supra.
14. See note 7 supra.
15. 416 U.S. at 656.
16. 15 N.C. App. 323, 329-30, 190 S.E.2d 333, 337 (1972).
17. See note 28 and accompanying text infra.
18. See text accompanying note 33 infra.
19. 282 N.C. 530, 193 S.E.2d 911 (1973).
20. 414 U.S. 907 (1973).
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the front line of management the anomalous status of employees."
Enforcement against respondent in this case of §§ 95-81 and 95-83
would plainly put pressure on respondent "to accord to the front
line of management the anomalous status of employees" and
would therefore flount the national policy against compulsion upon
either federal or state agencies to treat supervisors
employers from
21
as employees.
To appreciate the complex nature of the policies underlying the Beasley decision, it will be helpful to review the treatment of supervisors
under both the National Labor Relations Act and state law.
Prior to the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments, the status of supervisors under the National Labor Relations Act was unclear. Congress
had not elected to exclude them from the definition of employee. 22
Yet, when supervisors organized a union, the National Labor Relations
Board's policy was that such an organization of supervisors could not
be an appropriate bargaining unit.23 This discrepancy between the
language of the statute and the Board's interpretation of that language
was resolved in Packard Motor Co. v. NLRB, 24 in which the United
States Supreme Court said, "we see no basis in 'this Act whatever for
holding that foremen are forbidden the protection of the Act when they
take collective action to protect their collective interests.12 5 Congress
reacted to -this decision by including sections 2(3), 2(11), and 14(a)
in the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments. 26 Its purpose was to remove
supervisors from the protections of the Act and to relieve employers
"from any compulsion by this National Board or any local agency to
accord to the front line of management the anomalous status of employees."' 27 Since the passage of those sections, the National Labor
Relations Act has afforded no protection to supervisors who have been
28
discharged for union activity.
21. 416 U.S. at 662.
22. Ch. 372, § 2, 49 Stat. 450 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1970)
read as follows:
The term "employee" shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to
the employees of a particular employer, unless this subchapter explicitly states
otherwise, and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any
unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent employment, but shall not include any individual employed as
an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or person at
his home, or any individual employed by his parent or spouse ....
23. Maryland Drydock Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 733 (1943).
24. 330 U.S. 485 (1947).
25. Id. at 490.
26. See notes 2, 3, and 7 supra.
27. S.REP. No. 105, supra note 9, at 5.
28. NLRB v. Big Three Welding Equip. Co., 359 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1966); NLRB
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Subsequent to the amendments the United States Supreme Court
first faced the issue of state regulation of supervisor activity in Hanna
29
Mining Co. v. District 2, Marine Engineers Beneficial Association.
In that case plaintiffs brought suit under Wisconsin's anti-picketing statute to enjoin the union from picketing plaintiffs' vessels. The Supreme
Court of Wisconsin affirmed ° the trial cour's dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter because the picketing was arguably
prohibited by the National Labor Relations Act and, thus, state regulation of the activity was preempted. The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the Act did not preempt the state regulation under the
circumstances of the case. 1 The Court first summarized the ground
rules for preemption in labor law:- 2 "[-In general, a State may not
regulate conduct arguably 'protected by § 7, or prohibited by § 8' of
the National Labor Relations Act, . . . and the legislative purpose may

further dictate that certain activity 'neither protected nor prohibited' be
deemed privileged against state regulations. . . ,, 0 Because of an

earlier Board decision that Hanna's engineers were supervisors, 4 the
Court said their activities could not be arguably protected by section
7 or prohibited by section 8, thus removing this ground for preemption."5 The Court then considered whether "legislative purpose" required preemption. The union argued that the first clause of section
14(a) of the Act--"Nothing herein shall prohibit any individual employed as a supervisor from becoming or remaining a member of a
labor organization"-signified a policy of laissez faire toward supervisors that ousted both federal and state authority over supervisors'
conduct.30 In response, the Court stated: "This broad argument fails
utterly in light of the legislative history, for the Committee reports rev. Fullerton Publishing Co., 283 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1960); NLRB v. Inter-City Advertising Co., 190 F.2d 420 (4th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 908 (1952); NLRB
v. Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co., 169 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 908
(1949). But see cases cited note 10 supra.

29. 382 U.S. 181 (1965).
30. 23 Wis. 2d 433, 127 N.W.2d 393 (1964), rev'd, 382 U.S. 181 (1965).

31. 382U.S. at 194.
32. The development of federal preemption in labor law has been thoroughly
analyzed in Cox, Labor Law PreemptionRevisited, 85 HARv. L. Rav. 1337 (1972).

33. 382 U.S. at 187. In essence, section 7 protects the rights of employees to self
organization and collective bargaining. Section 8 lists a number of activities prohibited
as unfair labor practices.
34. In Hanna,as in Beasley, the Board had made an earlier determination that the
employees involved were supervisors and thus, were not subject to the protections of the
National Labor Relations Act. See note 11 supra.
35. 382 U.S. at 188.
36. Id. at 189.
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veal that Congress' propelling intention was to relieve employers from
any compulsion under the Act and under state law to countenance or
bargain with any union of supervisory employees. 3' 7 However, since
the state law involved in Hanna protected the employer by allowing
him to petition the state courts for an injunction against picketing, the
Court concluded that this legislative purpose would not be violated by
allowing the state injunction. 8 The question remaining after Hanna
was whether "legislative" purpose would require the preclusion of a
state law protecting the supervisor, rather than the employer.
In Beasley the United States Supreme Court began its inquiry by
stating that Hanna had construed only -the first clause of section 14(a)
and in doing so had allowed state regulations only when such regulation
furthered, not hindered, the "legislative purpose" of the Act. 39 Hanna
did not, in -the Court's view, foreclose preemption in cases like Beasley
in which state regulations violated the command of the second clause
40
of section 14(a).
At this point the Court turned to the petitioners' contention that
state damage remedies for discharge because of union membership do
not come within the ambit of -the second clause of section 14(a)-"no
employer subject to this Act shall be compelled to deem individuals
defined herein as supervisors as employees for the purpose of any law,
either national or local, relating 'to collective bargaining" -because
they do not relate to collective bargaining. Examination of the Court's
attempt to dispose of this contention discloses a weak link in the Court's
chain of logic.
The petitioners argued that because of the phrase "relating to collective bargaining," the second clause of section 14(a) was a "limited
prohibition against state regulations that compel an employer to bargain
collectively with unions that include supervisors as members,"' 41 and
that state damage remedies for discharge because of union membership
would not violate such a prohibition. The Court rejected this construction as too narrow. It stated that Congress' intention in passing sections 2(3), 2(11), and 14(a) was to "redress a perceived imbalance
in labor-management relationships that was found to arise from putting
supervisors in the position of serving two masters with opposed inter37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id.
Id. at 190.
416 U.S. at 657.
Id.
Id. at 658.
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ests." 4 2 Thus, the Court concluded that state damage remedies like
sections 95-81 and 95-83 of the North Carolina General Statutes

would, if applied, contradict this policy.
Unquestionably, Congress was concerned that, when supervisors

join unions, conflicts might result because of the supervisors' divided
loyalties between the employer and the rank and file workers.4 3 It is

equally clear that a law that might force an employer to retain a supervisor who belongs to a union would be within that concern. 44 It does
not, however, follow 'that such a law necessarily is one "relating to collective bargaining" as required by the second clause of section 14(a).45
The fact that an employer may be forced to retain a supervisor does

not mean that he will also be forced to bargain with the supervisor
either collectively or individually. The employer cannot be compelled
to bargain with or about supervisors under federal law,4 6 and the sec-

ond clause of section 14(a) seemingly would prevent a similar compulsion under state law. 47

supports this

The legislative history as discerned in Hanna

conclusion.48

Beasley's failure to follow the specific language of the second

clause of section 14(a) may have unforeseen consequences. First, the
Court's disregard of the "relating to collective bargaining" language extends the prohibition of 14(a) to any law that requires an employer
to deem a supervisor an employee for any purpose. Since any state
42. Id. at 661-62.
43. The evidence before the committee shows clearly that unionizing supervisors under the Labor Act is inconsistent with the purpose of the act to increase output of goods that move in the stream of commerce, and thus to increase its flow. It is inconsistent with the policy of Congress to assure to
workers freedom from domination or control by their supervisors in their organizing and bargaining activities. It is inconsistent with our policy to protect
the rights of employers; they, as well as workers, are entitled to loyal representatives in the plants, but when the foremen unionize, even in a union that
claims to be "independent" of the union of the rank and file, they are subject
to influence and control by the rank and file union, and, instead of their bossing the rank and file, the rank and file bosses them.
H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1947); S. REP. No. 105, supra note 9.
44. The North Carolina remedy for discharge arguably could have this effect since
the employer would either have to retain the supervisor or be liable in money damages
for his discharge.
45. The North Carolina law does not compel an employer in any way. It merely
subjects him to liability for discrimination in employment on the basis of union membership or non-membership. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-83 (1965).
46. NLRB v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 405 F.2d 1169 (2d Cir. 1968); West Pa.
Power Co. v. NLRB, 337 F.2d 993 (3d Cir. 1964); Deaton Truck Line, Inc. v. NLRB,
337 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1964); NLRB v. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 203 F.2d 165 (9th
Cir. 1953).
47. See note 7 supra.
48. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
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law that offers protection to supervisors would require an employer to
so deem a supervisor, 4 all such laws will be preempted. This result
seems to go beyond the specific intent of Congress in passing section
14(a).50
Secondly, in view of the Court's disregard of the language of section 14(a), it could be argued hat the Court, in reaching its decision
to preempt, relied primarily on the general policy supporting the exclusion of supervisors from the federal act.,' This argument could
easily be extended to preempt state laws that offer protection to other
classes of persons excluded from the National Labor Relations Act. If
successful, this would leave agricultural and domestic workers 2 in the
same situation that Beasley has left supervisors-without any protections under either federal or state laws. Again, it is questionable
whether Congress intended such a result."
Because of the questions raised by Beasley about the continued
effectiveness of state laws that protect those excluded from the National Labor Relations Act, congressional action is imperative. Congress should amend the National Labor Relations Act to allow supervisors to organize and bargain with their employers under the protection of the Act so long as they do not join unions composed of rank
and file employees. This action would solve the problem of conflicting
loyalties owed to the employer and the rank and file. At the same
time, such amendments would place supervisors on a more equal footing with the employer in bargaining about working conditions, wages,
and tenure.
THOMAS WARREN Ross
49. Any law that affords supervisors any rights and protections similar to those
granted to employees under the National Labor Relations Act would seem to be a law
"which compels an employer to deem a supervisor as an employee."
50. See note 9 supra.
51. See text accompanying note 21 supra. The language quoted by the Court is
the same as that used by Congress when it considered the exclusion of supervisors from
the federal Act. See text accompanying note 27 supra.
52. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1970) excludes both agricultural and domestic workers
from the definition of "employee" and thus denies them the protections of the Act.
53. Had Congress intended to preclude state as well as federal protection of these
persons it could easily have so provided.

